There are different perspectives on understanding the concepts of projective identification and countertransference. Both of these concepts are controversial in therapeutic scientific circles. It is believed that S. Freud negatively assessed the phenomenon of countertransference and saw in it a great obstacle to the advancement of the analytical process. Freud saw confirmation of this by examining himself, as well as by the examples of C. Jung and S. Spielrein, S. Ferenc and others. In a letter to Jung (dated June 7, 1909) he wrote: “Such experiences, although they are painful, should be avoided impossible. Without them, we will not know real life and what we have to deal with. I've never been caught like this myself, but I've been close to it many times and have had a hard time getting out... They (these experiences) only help develop the thick skin that we need and manage the "countertransference" which, in the end, is a constant problem for all of us . They teach us to direct our own affects towards the best goal.” In modern psychoanalysis, countertransference (CT) is defined either as the psychoanalyst’s unconscious reaction to the patient’s transference, or as all the analyst’s emotional reactions to the patient. O. Kernberg called this the classical and totalistic approaches. In the classic version, CP is a hindrance in the analyst’s work, and its origins are in the doctor’s neurotic conflicts. Representatives of various schools of object relations adhere to a more totalistic view of CP. According to G. Etchegoen, they give a positive assessment of CP, see in it an inevitable and necessary element of the analytical process and use it as a tool for understanding the patient. In object relations theories, CP turns out to be an inevitable companion to therapy, because The ego is subject to potential conflicts in all areas of activity. “There are no autonomous, conflict-free areas... and this also applies to the analyst’s ego,” says R. Hinshelwood. Klein believed that CP had its origins in the idea that the analyst's personal experiences are primarily, although not exclusively, a product of the patient's projective identification (PI). “This is the most important and potentially most useful aspect of countertransference.” Even P. Heimann (1950) was convinced that the CP is the creation of the patient. "The analyst subjectively experiences what can be understood as a representation of certain aspects of the patient's psyche." She considered the mechanism of projection and PI as a central component of the CP. O. Kernberg formulated a complex theory of CP, which illustrates how the idea of ​​PI explains the emergence of CP, how “the analyst’s unresolved conflicts, activated by the patient’s material, form an important component of the countertransference reaction.” L. Greenberg, a representative of Latin America, developed the Kleinian approach to the study of PC. He emphasized that “in response to the patient’s PI, the analyst reacts with his own PI, i.e. In an intense transference-countertransference relationship, mutual projection takes place. Consequently, the CP inevitably contains a mixture of elements, the projection of which occurs on both sides of the couch." He also put forward the idea of ​​fundamental differences between projective counter-identification and CP. "In the latter case, the analyst, identifying with the patient's object, experiences it as his own...the patient's object represents the analyst's own internal object...The analyst reacts passively to the patient's projection, but he does so on the basis of his own anxieties and conflicts." With projective counter-identification, the analyst’s reaction turns out to be “independent of his own conflicts and corresponds, predominantly or exclusively, to the intensity and quality of PI on the part of the analysand.” In his work “Magical Aspects of Paranoid and Depressive Anxieties” (1959), Greenberg analyzed the case of a patient who, already in the first session made the analyst feel like he was analyzing a corpse. When starting to work with this patient, the analyst noted with humor that the patient wanted to “load him with a corpse.” The patient tried to placein the analyst, his dead part - his sister, who committed suicide in early childhood. Greenberg analyzed his own fantasy of working with a dead body. This helped him cope with the situation. He explained this incident as a manifestation of projective counter-identification, a response to the patient’s PI. In this case, “the analyst ceases to be himself and turns into what the patient unconsciously wants him to be, without being able to avoid this.” But G. Etchegoen, considering this case, noted that the counter-transferential participation of the analyst cannot be rejected here, if only because “every analyst feels responsible for the patient, especially in the first sessions.” This is consistent with the remarks of Balint (1950): “that both patient and analyst have libidinal investments in each other and in the analysis... The descriptions of both participants remain incomplete if one most important property is neglected, namely, that all these phenomena occur in the relationship between two people, in a constantly changing object relationship." This view of analysis, according to R. Hinshelwood, is close to the discovery of S. Freud (1912) that analysis involves communication between the unconscious of the patient and the analyst, and that the transmission of unconscious messages, occurring at levels deeper than surface exchange, forms a very important part analytical process. “The doctor must turn his unconscious, like a perceiving organ, to the unconscious of the patient, perceive the analyzed person as a telephone receiver, a perceiving membrane...” Despite the contradictory views on the understanding of CP, most analysts still agree that CP includes a range of emotional responses to the patient , including transfer reactions. However, many questions require their own answers and further research. For example, is the CP solely a projection of the patient's inner world? Is only PI the main mechanism of CP? Does the CP really consist of projected elements of early mental states that Klein defined as the “paranoid-schizoid position”? Apparently, CP is a complex phenomenon. It contains derivatives of the patient’s projections (through PI) and the analyst’s psyche (his personal history and conflicts), situations of transference relationships “here and now”. As Isakover (1963) puts it, “during the analytic hour, the patient’s unconscious and the analyst’s unconscious form a temporary alliance that makes communication possible between the parties.” It is possible to describe a whole spectrum of CP reactions, from forms in neurotic patients to the reactions of psychotics. The further we move away from the “neurotic pole” and approach the “psychotic”, the more the patient’s transference among various influences on the therapist’s CP has an increasingly greater share, in contrast to the share determined by the therapist’s past. When working with borderline and severely regressed patients, the analyst experiences things differently than when working with neurotics. “The more disintegrated the patient, says M. Little (1951), the more necessary he will need an analyst who is well integrated.” According to Fliess, through the PI of a deeply disturbed patient, the therapist can experience a more pronounced regression in the CP. Such counter-identification, strong and long-lasting, expresses very early object-relations. The danger of entering into such a “chronic identification” is due to the fact that we are talking about a repressed or split-off early identity, which is associated with a very painful, traumatic relationship experience that the sphere of the Self could not integrate at the time when these early identifications occurred. Early self-identity also contains the results of pregenital aggressive impulses (identifications of an unusually aggressive nature), archaic forms of self defense and, above all, the PI mechanism, as described by M. Klein, P. Heimann and G. Rosenfeld. O. Kernberg (“Notes on countertransference”, 1965) believes that with PI the impulse projected onto an external object does not distance itself fromsphere of the Self and is not experienced as an alien Self, and that is why it is not distanced, that the relation of the Self to this projected impulse continues to be preserved, in which the Self remains empathically connected with the object. The fear that appears as a result of the projection “now turns into a fear of the object, and therefore the need arises to master this object and exercise control over it, so that under the influence of an impulse it does not attack the Self. The boundaries between the Self and the object begin to disappear (loss of self-boundaries), because the projected impulse still partly belongs to the Self, and therefore in this area the Self and the object merge chaotically with each other.” At such a moment, the analyst is forced to face several dangers: the possible emergence of old fears due to impulses of a strongly expressed aggressive nature that will be directed against the patient; blurring of the I - boundaries with this particular patient; the temptation to dominate the patient, because the patient identifies with a threatening object from the therapist's own history. Most analysts analyzed are able to withstand the perception of their own aggressive impulses, process them and thereby help the patient, giving him a share of emotional confidence. In the process of PI, only some parts of the analyst's self fall into empathic regression. The more mature main part of the Self is kept ready to function. It also covers the mature part of the self - identity with adaptive and cognitive structures. PI destroys the boundaries of the Self in the area of ​​interaction between the analyst and the patient. More mature I-functions that normally stabilize I-boundaries will compensate for these losses. If the analyst is unable to free himself from the CP, then he becomes increasingly entangled, which can even continue for months. The literature (Cohen 1952, Glover 1955, Little 1951, Menninger 1958, Winnicott 1960) describes certain signs and symptoms of such processes. O. Kernberg in his book “Aggression in Personality Disorders and Perversions” gives a number of examples where, for example, the analyst has become distrustful of one patient or even has paranoid fantasies that the patient can harm him and even imagines how this could happen; or the analyst notices that his internal reactions to a given patient are expanding, i.e. the analyst's emotional reactions include other persons who have something to do with his relationship with this patient, etc. Thus, the patient managed to destroy the more stable and mature I-identity of the analyst within the therapeutic relationship, and the therapist “duplicates” the emotional position of the patient, without being able to control this process. Therefore, when working with deeply regressed patients, a certain external structuring is important, i.e. clear formulation of the boundaries of the patient’s behavior and actions. Within the framework of CP reactions, H. Rucker (1957) distinguishes two types of identifications: concordant and complementary. With concordant identification, the analyst identifies with the corresponding part of the patient’s mental apparatus, i.e. I am with I, Super - I am with Super - I. The analyst experiences the same feeling as the patient. Empathy can be understood as a direct manifestation of concordant identification. In terms of object relations theory, concordant identification identifies the analyst with the same representation that is activated in the patient, Self with Self, object with object. H. Deutsch introduced the concept of complementary identification, in which the analyst experiences the feelings that the patient attributes to his transference object. For example, the analyst may identify with the patient's superego function, like a strict prohibitive father, and feel a tendency to criticize, blame the patient, dominate him, while the patient fears, submits or protests. O. Kernberg believes that the analyst and the patient are at times time, representations of the Self and the object are played out, corresponding to certain internalized object relations. For example, "an analyst may behave»