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“...powerlessness that does not reward - into “kindness”; cowardly meanness - into “humility”; submitting to those who are hated is “obedience.” The harmlessness of the weak, the very cowardice of which he has a shortage, his begging, his inevitable fate of always being expected to receive here too nice a name - “patience”, it is just as well called virtue; the inability to avenge oneself is called unwillingness to take revenge, perhaps even forgiveness (“for they do not know what they do, only we know what they do!”). They also talk about “loving your enemies” - and sweat at the same time” F. Nietzsche “Geneology of Morality” (section 1, fragment 14) F. Nietzsche’s reflections that the idea of ​​resentment lies in the structure of Christian morality opens up for the psychotherapist a different understanding of the problems of the subject’s relationship both with the Other and with himself. The word “resentiment” is of French origin, and it is difficult to find its Russian meaning in order to convey its direct meaning in our language. However, if you make an intuitive alienation of this word from its contextual content and, subsequently, give it to phenomenological cutting, then you can get closer to its understanding. The first thing that comes to the surface when thinking about what resentment is is that the phenomenon is directly related to experience, and the latter in its deep structure is colored by negative affect. And this negative experience is repressed into the “core” of the self. So, for example, one of the Russian translations of the word “resentiment” is revealed in the phrase “hidden anger” (revenge, resentment, envy, etc.). Of course, this is just one of the epistemological attempts to discover the meaning of the word “resentiment”. At the same time, it does not reflect the entire spiritual fullness of the intuitive essence of the thought about resentment, which the philosopher himself put into it. Despite this, we can continue to move in the understanding that there is resurgence in the Russian-speaking space. The “core” of negative affect is hidden from the subject’s consciousness due to its denial. And its shoots come to the surface in the form of “virtue,” as Nietzsche says. The pseudo-do-gooder consists of threads of a negative vision of the world around him, and throws the experience of resentment onto Others, marking them as carriers of his (but it is better to use the pronoun “my”) guilt. Guilt, which is covered by the fear of turning the appraising gaze from the outside to oneself and one’s personal existence. Perhaps, at this point in our reflections, we can talk about the so-called psychic mechanism, like a projection, which unconsciously encourages the resentmental subject to “invest” in the Other fragments of non-acceptance of his anxious and vulnerable self. The bearer of resentment reveals himself only in relations with the Other. For ressentiment, the Other is important and valuable not as an autonomous figure and subject, but as an object for the reaction of “hidden anger.” The other acts as a “release” and release of tension for the resentmental subject. In this case, we can discern dialectical content within the bearer of resentment. On the one hand there is negative affect, and on the other there is “virtue”. However, we cannot give a moral assessment of the “core” of ressentiment - this is there and this is a fact. Our attention is more attracted to pseudo-virtue, which splits the subject and inclines towards genuine existence. “Virtue” plays a different role than the negative affect of ressentiment. Concealing one’s hidden affect turns the subject’s words and gestures into a calm self-understanding that “everything is fine with him, like everyone else.” We can say that it is this “virtue” that is the beginning of the formation of dysfunctional relationships with the Other. At this point, the psychotherapist may have a different understanding of what codependent relationships are and how they function from the point of view of the idea of ​​resentment. The attempt at a phenomenological description of resentment is not limited to the above considerations. Deeper and more extensive descriptionThe fact that this phenomenon exists from a philosophical point of view can be gleaned from M. Scheler’s book “Ressentiment in the Structure of Morals.” At the same time, one’s own reflections on resentment in the context of psychotherapeutic practice are always open to critical discussion and other hermeneutic interpretation. Now I wanted to move on to how resentment can take shape in the situation of a psychotherapy room, using the example of one of the psychotherapy approaches. F. Nietzsche’s intuition delights with its sharpness of statements and surgical precision in revealing what is hidden in a person’s existence. In our condemnatory passage against Christian morality, which was given at the beginning of this publication, we can see the core of such a direction in psychotherapy, which strives to help the patient solve his problem in a limited time frame. The name of this type of therapy is short-term psychotherapy. And the method that turns “cowardly meanness into humility <...>, and hatred into obedience” is called content reframing in psychology. If we try to unpack reframing using phenomenological language, we can say that a change in the subject’s thinking occurs due to a change in his focus of perception towards the desired value of himself and social acceptability for Others. We can immediately intuitively feel that there is some kind of superficial movement in subjectivity that does not affect the historicity of the subject. Content reframing captures, as it were, a person in the present and makes a dialectical superstructure so that the subject wraps his vulnerable sides of the personality with a sense of the dignity of these sides, but with a new meaning. This perception can temporarily instill confidence in one's own abilities and confidence in the determination to take the first step in acquiring new experiences to begin the process of change in one's life. However, the illusion of this force in its structure is still “weak” and vulnerable enough to become stable, and therefore the therapist strives to constantly reinforce this illusion with a gesture of support. Thus, we can say that reframing is a therapeutic “language game” where each player temporarily closes his eyes to the reality of the experience of vulnerability as a paradox of human existence. The appearance that new meaning-making brings comfort and convenience to its bearer is a narcissistic conceit of hiding one’s own limitations from oneself, and as a result, there is an accumulation of tense doubt about the right to be, and not to seem. Reframing hides from the subject the opportunity to face his authenticity. Speaking in terms of analytical psychology, the shadow side of the personality remains unattended and, thus, the process of individuation is vulnerable to the acute experience of existential guilt. No matter how “good” the patient strives to become in the eyes of Others, reframing is like a pot lid trying to hold the pressure of boiling water. The subject not only turns away from authenticity, but also refuses to live human weakness and vulnerability. It is living that gives a feeling of integration of one’s self. Seeing what causes fear and anxiety within yourself gives the real power of facing yourself. We can say that the “core” of ressentiment, in its Nietzschean concept, reveals to a person the presence of himself in the context of his historicity. The subject comes to understand his “place” in the autonarrative. It is at this moment that the reconstruction of personal existence is realized with the help of self-constitution. At the same time, this movement is illuminated by the horizon of new events. So, if we continue our reflections further in the study of F. Nietzsche’s intuition, then a clear understanding comes about the other side of the process of reframing for the subject - this therapeutic technique tries to keep a person in the averageness of his everyday existence. After all, when we think deeply about this, a different understanding of this opens up before us. Namely, sometimes short-term techniques in psychotherapy are just a reflection of that consumer.